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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new approach to secure data
encryption for high bit-rates communications. The
proposed scheme is based on RPK, a new
cryptographic algorithm based on the discrete
logarithm problem implemented by a discrete
exponentiation over finite Galois fields GF[2n] and
the Alternating Stop and Go as a Stream Cipher
Block. The paper describes RPK architecture
solutions yielding to low-complexity
implementations, particularly suitable for encrypting
high bit-rates multimedia contents. A comparison
with alternative encryption schemes such as the
classical RSA shows the implementation advantages
of the RPK approach.
1- INTRODUCTION
Secure transmission requirements are not an original
issue of the contemporary world, indeed solutions to
these problems have been pursued for centuries. Some
examples from ancient or recent history, such as the
messages used by Julius Cesar and the Enigma code
during the Second World War, are signs of this
interest that in the past was usually limited to
applications in the military field.
Nowadays, the increasing use of transmission of
digital content over communication networks, of
which the success of the world-wide-web is the
clearest example, raises new security issues in
transmission. This fact is the main reason of the
growing research interest in the evolution of
cryptographic algorithm with application to secure
digital transmissions. For instance, the birth of
electronic trade has been giving a great development
to cryptography. An important security issue of the
electronics trade is the non-repudiation mechanism.
The goal is to ascertain the operator identity and to
establish a mechanism in order to ascribe
responsibility of action to the operator. The solution
of this problem is the main reason of the recent
introduction of public-key crypto systems. Their main
characteristic is the one-way functionality concept. A
one-way-function is a function f(x) for which it is
easy, known x, to compute f(x), but it is significantly
much harder (and ideally not possible in a reasonable
amount of time) to perform the inverse operation.
Unfortunately state of the art public-key crypto systems
with high security transmission performance require
high processing resources when applied to high bit-rates
and result not suitable for modern multimedia
communications.
The paper is organized as follows, the second part of this
section briefly summarize the main features of public-
key and symmetric key systems. Section 2 describes in
more details the RPK algorithm, with a particular
attention to the innovative features that are particularly
interesting for high throughput applications, while the
last section reports a comparison between RPK and RSA
implementation features. Public-key crypto systems can
be divided in 4 main groups defined by the problem,
needed to be solved, to crack the system:
PROBLEM ALGORITHM
Factorization problem RSA
Discrete logarithm Diffie-Hellman
Elliptic Curves Elliptic Curves
Knapsack algorithm Knapsack algorithm
The most known and used algorithms belong to the first,
second, and third group, while the fourth group of
algorithms is not very popular since it has been
successfully attacked in different ways. By employing an
adequate key bit length, the first three groups of
algorithms can be considered very secure. All of them
operate on fixed length data blocks, where the
public/private key is used to crypt/decrypt the message.
We refer to these classes of systems as “block systems”.
Unfortunately, the main drawback for the applications of
these crypto systems at high bit-rates is the complexity
of the encryption/decryption processing which results
directly proportional to the number of bit to be
processed.
Another class of crypto system is known as “stream
cipher systems”. The stream ciphers systems operate
with a time-varying transformation on individual plain-
text digits. A stream cipher uses a short key to generate
the key-stream, which appears to be random. Using, for
instance, a non-linear combination of Linear Feedback
Shift Register (LFSR) it is possible to make a good
pseudo-random key-stream generator. Stream ciphers
systems can operate very fast on the bit-streams are
relatively easy to implement; and generally result much
faster than block ciphers. Conversely stream ciphers are
symmetric-key systems and, for this reason, they are
unable to provide secure non-repudiation mechanisms
[1].
The most popular crypto systems are based on hybrid
method, i.e. an asymmetric algorithm to initialize a
symmetric one. This is a compromise between key
security key, management and the speed of the stream
cipher systems or hash functions generation.
2- THE RPK ALGORITHM
Crypto systems based on blocks such as RSA or
Diffie-Hellman, as discussed in the previous
paragraph present a high level of security, but require
large computational resources when applied to high
bit-rate tasks. Conversely, stream ciphers systems are
low cost and fast, but they cannot be considered
secure enough against attacks.
The RPK approach to public-key encryption combines
the best characteristics of both classical crypto block
systems and stream ciphers systems yielding a secure
system that requires very low processing resources at
very high throughput rates.
All RPK system basic operations are mathematically
equivalent to the exponentiation in finite fields [4].
The private and public operation scheme of RPK is
depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the RPK public key
Crypto-system.
Main features of the scheme are:
À The RPK system is based on the discrete
logarithm problem. This means that in this
system a public key is calculated from a private
key using operations mathematically equivalent
to exponentiation in finite fields.
À For reasons of computational efficiency, speed
and security, the finite fields underlying the RPK
system are the Galois fields GF[2p] where p is a
Marsenne prime number ( i.e. p and 2p-1 must be
both prime numbers).
À The choice of the private key is made without any
restriction, thus making possible the creation of
the private key with a simple random generator.
À The cipher-text has exactly the same length of the
plain-text, provided that a short header block
enabling the correct set-up of the system for the
decryption is transmitted before the cipher-text.
À Each state of the machine has no memory of its
history. In other words, if we place the machine into
any particular state and then it evolves to successive
states by means of “clock” cycles, the sequence of
outputs will be the same regardless of how the
machine happened to arrive at that state.
À RPK is a non-deterministic crypto-system therefore
if the same key is used to encrypt a given plain-text
the resulting cipher-texts will differ in a non-
systematic way, ideally in a random fashion.
À Crypto-system can also be classified according to
whether they are block system or stream system. In
the case of RPK the classification cannot be applied,
since it possesses some of the characteristics of both
systems. However, it is probably more appropriate
to consider the RPK system as a stream system.
À Encryption and decryption do not commute in this
system; however it is possible to use alternative
methods for secure signatures and/or authentication.
3- THE RPK SYSTEM
The RPK system involves two phases, an initialization
phase and a combining or streaming phase. These are not
two separate cryptographic algorithms, but instead are
best viewed as two connected parts of the RPK
approach, unified by the concept of a Mixture Generator.
The Mixture Generator is a pseudorandom binary key-
stream generator. The probability distribution of the
mixture, in the case when there are finite number of
random variables being mixed, is a "convex
combination" of the distributions of the components. It is
easy to show that a mixture of independent identically
uniform-distributed random variables is itself uniform
[4]. The mixer outputs, or its states, are used to select, in
a memory-less fashion, outputs from members of a set of
other component pseudo-random binary generators. The
Mixture Generator and the other components are
maximal-period linear shift register generators
(MLSRGs). When using MLSRGs as component
generators, it is essential to use generators with the
mathematical property that their generator polynomials
are primitive polynomials. An important property is that
they may have a prime number of stages (2n-1), so that
the bit lengths of the keys must be Marsenne primes.
Usually, the RPK encryption/decryption process [5]
begins with the transmission of the Public Key, which
can be known by everybody. The first and the second
diagram of figure 2 depict “the Public” steps of the
process during the beginning of encryption.
“The Public” operator first generate a “true” random
number R. The diagram illustrates using the finite state
machine representation how to reach the state Q that is R
steps away from the initial state X0. “The Public” then
sends Q to “the Private” key owner as shown in the
scheme of figure 1.
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Figure 2. The Mixture Generator.
“The Public” reset the machine and then loads it with
the state E represented by the public key. Despite the
fact that the number of steps needed to get to E from
the initial state is unknown (private key) “the Public”
is able to use the machine to jump to a state R times
further along in the state sequence than E is. “The
Public’s” machine has now arrived at a state K,
mathematically represented by ER, that is RD (R times
D) steps away from the initial state. This completes
the RPK initialization phase and “the Public” is ready
for the stream cipher system.
The third diagram depicts “the Private” steps
representing the initialization process.
“The Private” first receives Q and sets the machine
with the state represented by Q. Then, using the same
special abilities of the machine, the recipient jumps to
a state D times further along the state sequence than
Q. Here “the Private” knows Q and D, but does not
know R (the random number selected by “the Public”
specifically for this message). Nevertheless, the
recipient’s Mixture Generator has now arrived at a
state mathematically represented by QD that is also
RD steps away from the initial state. That is, it has
managed to arrive at the same state K. Having
completed the initialization phase, “the Private” is
now ready to initialize the stream cipher system to
find the key-stream’s output sequence as “the Public”
and to decrypt the cipher-text received.
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Figure 3. Scheme of the architecture for the implementation
of high bitrate RPK crypto systems.
The advantages of mixer generator configurations are
that their periods are very long, their distributions of
zeros and ones is well-balanced, and successive
outputs are substantially non-correlated. Theirs
outputs also have excellent statistical properties in terms
of their n-tuple distributions and runs statistics.
An example of mixture-generator is the alternative stop-
and-go [3] as shown in Figure 4. This architecture
combined with the RPK private/public key scheme
provides an extremely secure and low-complexity
implementation of a complete crypto-system.
Considering the extremely long periodicity of such
generators (i.e. of the orders of 2 power 607) it is not
feasible to crack the system by actually run them long
enough to extract the content of each MLSRGs. Usually,
even very high bitrate multimedia transmissions explore
only a tiny fraction of the number of states required to
decrypt and possibly crack the system.
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Figure 4. Scheme of an alternating stop-and-go mixture
generator.
A highly compact and efficient method for calculating
the future state of single MLSRG exists. It is based on
interpreting the contents of the stages of the register as
coefficients of a polynomial in one "indeterminate" x.
Using this interpretation over the Galois fields [2] it is
possible to reduce the exponentiation operation to a
much easier polynomials multiplication. This operation,
in practice, is very simple and can be efficiently
implemented using the shift register itself.
The other steps to encrypt the message are based the
same type of operations, the only difference is that the
exponent become the initial state and vice versa. Finding
the final states K, after the initialization phase, is
possible to use the mixture generator and generate the
key-stream.
4- COMPARISON RPK AND RSA+3DES
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLEXITIES
Figure 5 shows typical qualitative curves of the
processing time/complexity of RPK and RSA+3DES
versus the bit/bit-rate of the plain/cipher-text at the same
security level (RPK key length = 607 bit; RSA key
length = 512 bit). We can notice that in the case of RPK
after an initial "setup time" this machine can encrypt and
decrypt messages very efficiently. In fact once the
machine has been initialized, the only factor that
determines the bit rate output capabilities of a RPK
system is the complexity of the stream-cipher and
plain/cipher-text mixing.
Assuming to use the "alternative stop-and-go" as mixing
algorithm [3] and architecture the output bit rate can be
the same order of magnitude than the clock of the
internal machine. The only operations necessary for this
type of mixing are the passage to a future state in one of
the two LFSRs (only a shift register operation); and the
xor operation between one bit of the key-stream and
the each bit of the plain/cipher-text in the Combining
Block.
An extremely high level of security can be guaranteed
since long private keys such as for instance with a
1279 (Marsenne prime) bit length do not affect the
throughput performance, but only increase the set up
time. Figure 5 illustrates the fact that the RPK curves
slope only depends on the complexity of f(M,C). The
figure also shows that the RPK system is less
appropriate in terms of complexity for short messages.
In fact, the start-up time is larger than the RSA+3DES
encryption/decryption time, but with the increase of
the message length the RPK system becomes rapidly
convenient.
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Figure 5. RSA+3DES - RPK performance comparison
The threshold only depends on the first RPK system
phase, the initialization.
4.1- Software Implementation
It is possible to reduce the start up time introducing a
memory to the basic implementation of RPK systems.
The representation of the polynoms necessary to
compute the exponentiation can be pre-computed and
stored in memory yielding processing reductions of
the initialization phase of about 70% for 607 key
lengths (45Kbytes) and even higher for longer keys. A
complexity analysis shows that the largest part of the
processing is given by the polynoms multiplication
and the "shifter operation". The diagram in Figure 6
reports the number of operations for each data type of
the complete algorithm (left column) while the right
column reports the fraction corresponding to of the
“shifter” function.
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Figure 6. Number of operations for a 607 key-length RPK
initialization phase based on processing data of 32 and 64
bits. Left columns, total number of operations; right column
number of “shift” operations.
4.2- Hardware Implementation
The operation to be executed in the initialization phase
of RPK is the exponentiation in GF[2n]. The
exponentiation can be implemented in hardware by
means of a “square module” and a “multiplication
module”. To execute an exponentiation AD, assuming
A = a020+a121+…+an2n and D = d020+d121+…+dn2n the
exponentiation results: 
n
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0
⋅⋅= , it
means executing squares (A, A2, A4, A8,…, A2^n) and
multiplication between the last result and the next square
only if the correspondent D-bit is one.
The square (mod p(x)) can be implemented in a single
clock cycle as depict in the figure7.
p0 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8
p0 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 P11 p12 p13 p14 p15 p16
p0 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 P8
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
p0 ⊕ p7 p5 p1 ⊕ p8 p6 p2 ⊕ p7 p5 ⊕ p7 p3 ⊕ p8 P6 ⊕ p8 p4
Figure 7. Example of square with 9 bits and p(x)=1+x4+x9.
5- CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new public-key encryption
approach for high bit-rate applications suitable for
secure multimedia communications. RPK
implementations are based on an initialization phase and
a low complexity streaming phase that is the only stage
of the algorithm concerned by high bit-rate processing.
These features make RPK system an advantageous
solution to secure multimedia digital content
transmission when compared to the classical
RSA+3DES systems.
This work was done in collaboration with RPK Securité SA, Suisse.
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